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Book Reviews
COURTS

ON

TRiAL. By Jerome Frank. Princeton University Press, 1949. Pp. XII,

411. $5.00.
"The rankest amateur in psychology knows how faulty observation is ... Human observation is obviously fallible, subjective." (p. 17) "As silent witnesses of the
witnesses, the trial judges and juries suffer from the same human weaknesses as other
witnesses." (p. 22) "A trial court's findings of fact is, then, at best, its belief or opinion about someone else's belief or opinion." (p. 22) "The pulchritude of the plaintiff
or his religion or his economic status, or the manners of the respective attorneys, or
the like, may well be the determining factor inducing the decision." (p. 54) "His
(the trial judge's) impressions, colored by his unconscious biases with respect to
the witnesses, as to what they said, and with what truth and accuracy they said it,
will determine what he believes to be the 'facts of the case.' His innumerable hidden
traits and predispositions often get in their work in shaping his decision in the very
process by which he becomes convinced what those facts are." (p. 152) "Certain
kinds of witnesses may arouse his (the judge's) attention more than others. Or
may arouse his antipathies or win his sympathy. The 'facts' it must never be overlooked are not objective. They are what the judge thinks they are. And what he
thinks they are depends on what he hears and sees as the witnesses testify-which
may not be, and often is not, what another judge would hear or see. Assume
('fictionally') the most complete rigidity of the rules relating to commercial transactions. . . Still since the 'facts' are only what the judge thinks they are, the
decision will vary with the judge's apprehension of the facts." (p. 55) "The axiom
or assumption that, in all or most trials, the truth will out, ignores, then, the several elements of subjectivity and chance." (p. 20)
From the above quotations and many others in similar vein in this book, it
may be gathered that Judge Frank's main thesis runs something like this:
(1) All men are possessed of many frailties-fallible eyesight, fallible hearing,
fallible memories, and many prejudices, predispositions, and psychological inhibitions that warp their minds, and therefore they cannot be relied upon to ascertain
and state the true facts.
(2) A witness is a man. Therefore he cannot be relied upon to ascertain and
state the true facts.
(3) A juror is a man. Therefore he cannot be relied upon to ascertain and
state what the witnesses said were the true facts.
(4) A trial judge is a man. Therefore he cannot be relied upon to ascertain and
state what the witnesses said were the true facts.
(5) An appellate judge is a man. Therefore he cannot be relied upon to ascertain and state what the trial judge said that the witnesses said were the true facts.
From this concatenation it would seem to follow that:
(6) Since Judge Frank is a man he cannot be relied upon to ascertain and state
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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what the appellate judge said that the trial judge said that the witnesses said were
the true facts.
(7) I am a man. Therefore I cannot be relied upon to ascertain and state what
Frank said that the appellate judge said that the trial judge said that the witnesses
said were the true facts.
(8) But neither can any other man. So why should anyone read Frank's book
or this review?
All of which would seem to indicate that Judge Frank is the victim of his own
devastating logic. By trying to prove too much he fails to prove anything. Over
and over again throughout his book, in order to support his thesis that the verdicts
of juries and the findings of fact by judges do not conform to the true facts, he
relies (as indeed he must) upon what he conceives to be the facts in law suits or
about law suits, as ascertained by other persons, sometimes three or four stages
removed, or upon generalized statements in or about law suits, of other persons
based upon their interpretation of facts, as gathered by still other persons. But all
these persons are as fallible and therefore as unreliable as the witnesses upon whom
juries and judges rely. A few examples selected at random will suffice to show this.
On page 114 the author says "Longnecker?' in a certain book said "In talking to a
man who had recently served for two weeks on juries, he stated" etc. Then there is
set out what this juror said other jurors said in connection with reaching a verdict.
On the same page Frank states what Judge Rossman said that jurors had said about
the procedure used in reaching verdicts, all of which evidence Frank takes, without
so much as a qualm, as proof that juries do not decide cases in accordance with the
evidence.
Then on page 163 Frank quotes Montaigne: "For it is certain that we meet
with judges who are at times harsher, more captious, more prone to convict and at
another more easy going, complaisant and more inclined to pardon," the conclusion
being that even judges are not controlled by the evidence or are not objective.
Since Judge Frank was not himself a witness of the facts in the cases he discusses it is only upon the basis of such evidence or opinions as the above that he
can state that the "true" facts in a particular case are different from what the judge
or jury in the case said they were. But his main thesis throughout the book is that
evidence of this sort is unreliable because of defects in sight, hearing, or memory, or
because of the prejudices, or predispositions of the witnesses through whom the
information passes. If Frank's conclusion is true that a judge's or jury's finding of
facts does not conform to the true facts because of the general unreliability of witnesses then there is no way of proving it, or if there is a way of proving it, then the
conclusion is not true.
Occasionally he limits his statements to disputed cases, but most of the time
they are general and without qualification. Anyway, dispute or no dispute, all witnesses have the human frailties which Frank says makes their evidence unreliable.
Frank calls himself a "fact-skeptic" (one of the originals) as well as a "ruleskeptic," (though he has weakened considerably on his rule-skepticism since 1930,
cf. p. 16 with his Law and the Modern Mind, Chaps. 13 & 14). Many other sohttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss1/10
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called realists like Oliphant, Llewellyn, Cook and Judge Cordozo are "rule-skeptics"
but not "fact-skeptics," and unless one is a "fact-skeptic" he is a victim of "legal
magic" just like the mine-run of lawyers and professors of law. "The rule-skeptics"
says Frank, "are but the left-wing adherents of the old magical tradition." (p. 74)
The base of the judicial structure, argues Frank, is the trial-court, because it
is the agency for finding the facts and unless the facts are found correctly (and
they cannot be) so that legal rules can be applied to them, prediction of the outcome of litigation becomes impossible, and the element of certainty in the law is
completely illusory.
What is his remedy? One suggestion is more witnesses. Let us have witnesses
(psychologists) of the witnesses. (p. 100) But he does not tell us by what magic
he would make these witnesses of the witnesses any more reliable than the witnesses
themselves. Or he would have government officials independently dig up the facts.
(p. 98) But they would still be fallible witnesses. Another proposal is to abolish
the jury in civil cases and let the trial judge find the facts. But Frank spends whole
chapters showing that judges are as frail as jurors. ("Are Judges Human?") It
seems rather obvious that if we accept the author's premises there is no remedy.
What is the fallacy in Frank's line of reasoning, if any? Since the evidence upon
which he relies to establish his case is the same kind of evidence, he contends is
completely unreliable, something of value can be salvaged from his book only by
assuming that he does not mean all that he says. True he repeatedly poo-poos the
idea that "the truth will out." But unless it is assumed that he says this with his
tongue in his cheek, he is simply engaged in promoting futility, and I don't believe
he is interested in that. The author can hardly be unaware of the evidence all about
him that people, frail as they are, must accurately interpret what they see, hear and
feel everyday of their lives. Their very survival depends upon it. That man has
survived up to now, shows at least that he has not always been mistaken about the
conditions which surround him. That he has been able, not merely to adapt himself to his environment but to modify it for the purpose of satisfying his needs and
desires, and that he has been able to set up social and political institutions (including
the courts themselves) to enable him to live as a part of civilized society, furnish
substantial evidence that he has the capacity for collecting, appraising and analyzing the facts of life. An individual, a committee, a commission, a board, a judge,
a jury can and do get the facts in matters assigned to them for investigation. They
are sometimes wrong but they are, I think, most frequently right. There are so
many ways of correcting, checking, and verifying evidence-witness with witness,
document with document, witness with document, improbability with probability,
the unreasonable with the reasonable, the unscientific with the scientific, the unscholarly with the scholarly, that it is believed most frequently "the truth will out"
Has the perfect (undetectable) murder yet been committed?
It is true, as Frank vividly points out, that there are a number of factors connected with trial-court procedure that actually hamper the ascertainment of the
true facts. Among them may be mentioned the sporting or game-of-chance aspect of
a trial in which lawyers use evidence "as one plays a trump card, or draws to three
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aces" (p. 91), the intimidation and badgering of witnesses especially on cross-examination, excess of partisan zeal on the part of attorneys leading to the suppression or distortion of evidence, application of certain rules of evidence which hamper
a witness in telling his full story, inability of a party to pay for an investigator before trial to obtain evidence necessary to his case, and the disparity in the ability
of legal counsel on the two sides. I agree with Frank that these and other defects
in trial procedure should be eliminated if possible.
However, Frank does not show that these handicaps are not more than offset
by advantages which a court has over individuals and committees for getting at the
trutli. Some of these are: irrelevant issues are eliminated before trial; the solemnity
of the court room and the requirement that witnesses be placed under oath impress
witnesses with the seriousness of the matter and make them more cautious and
accurate in their satements; the partizan zeal of attorneys makes it more probable
that relevant facts will not be overlooked, than if the investigation is left to a dispassionate examiner; certain rules of evidence, like those requiring original or certified documents, and the "best" evidence as distinguished from hearsay, tend to
make evidence more reliable; and the court's power to compel the attendance of
witnesses and the production of documents or other tangible evidence gives the
court a material advantage over individuals and non-governmental committees
and boards in getting at the truth of the matter under investigation. So I think
it likely that trial courts are at least as dependable as individuals and private
investgiating groups in getting at the facts in particular situations.
Frank's overall conclusion is that because of the inability of the courts and
juries to find the "true" facts, accurate prediction of court decisions is impossible.
But his argument as I have tried to show, consists so much of overstatement and
generalization, so much of using the same kind of evidence that he repeatedly condemns, that his case is unconvincing. Suppose we examine this question of predictability a little further.
It is amazing to me that a legal realist would restrict his concept of law to
what transpires in the courtroom and completely exclude what happens in the outside world. Frank's theory of rights and duties is limited to what courts decide
in particular cases. He says "If no court-order has been entered with respect to any
of your legal rights or mine, then those rights are not yet known, but can only be
guessed. Maybe you have some particular right and maybe you haven't. The only
way you can find out definitely is to see what a court will do about it." (p. 9)
'Whether it will sometime be decided that any one of you is to go to jail, or to
lose or keep your house, or collect the money on a mortgage you hold, or have the
custody of your children, or remain the president of your company-any of such
matters may be determined by a now unpredictable future court decision in a case
relating specifically to you. Whether any such suit will arise, and how it will be
decided, no one now knows. For no one can now prophesy if, or when, or where,
any such suit will be brought; or if one is brought whether there will be conflicting
testimony; or if so what it will be; or whether the suit will be tried by a jury or a
judge, or what judge, or how the jury or judge will react to the testimony. Wherehttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss1/10
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fore, until those cases arise and are decided, your legal rights and duties are unknown." (p. 12) And further. on the author states "Legal rights and duties mean
law suits lost or won." (p. 25) (I wonder why Frank stops with the court's judgment A judgment may be set aside for fraud or lack of jurisdiction.)
Suppose an inexperienced old lady came to Attorney Frank (a practicing
lawyer) and said to him "I lent my neighbor a $1,000 and he signed and gave
me this paper agreeing to repay it in one year. Now I don't know anything about
business or law. Does this written statement of his amount to anything." An inspection reveals that the statement is an ordinary negotiable note. By questioning
the old lady, it is ascertained that the neighbor does not deny receiving the money
or executing the note, that there is no question as to the sanity of the neighbor or
his financial responsibility, and it appears that the parties are on friendly terms.
Each of these points is verified by questioning the neighbor and other persons, and
no evidence is found which would render the note invalid. The old lady then asks
"What are my rights?" To be consistent with the views expressed in this book,
Frank would have to say "I'm sorry to have to tell you, my dear lady, that if you
have any rights, they are unknown. You will have no rights until you sue on this
note and get a judgment against your neighbor. This is true, because no one can
predict how such an action would turn out Some lying witness might appear
and swear he saw your neighbor repay you the $1,000; or that you induced him to
sign the note by misrepresentation or trickery, or. any other of a number of facts
that could defeat your recovery. These possibilities make the outcome of litigation
on this note uncertain and therefore unpredictable. So as matters stand I cannot
say that you have any rights whatsoever. No doubt this will be a source of worry
to you, but because of the nature of law that is the best opinion I can give you."
If the old lady asked for Frank's opinion on the title to her property which
she had acquired 50 years before, showed him her warranty deed to it, and an
abstract which indicated title in her with no imperfections, and evidence showed
that there were no liens or mortgages of record against the property and that no
one now or. ever had questioned her title to the property or asserted a claim
against it, Frank would have to say "While all you tell me appears to be true, I
cannot say that you own the property. Ownership consists essentially of certain
legal rights with respect to property, and it cannot be known that you have any
legal rights until you have gone to court, and obtained a judgment establishing
them. It is impossible to predict what the outcome of that litigation would be. So
I cannot advise you that you are the owner of the property."
The basic fallacy of Frank's position in this matter, as I see it, is that he almost
completely ignores the law of probabilities. He dismisses the whole subject on page
222 with the aphorism "Of course we must rely upon probabilities," (which if he
did, would destroy much of all he had said on the 221 preceding pages) and a short
quotation on pp. 340-341 from Jevons to the effect that "Attempts to apply the
theory of probability to the results of judicial proceedings have proved of little
value" (the kind of proof that Frank takes great pains all through the book to
show untrustworthy). To Frank all future events are certain or uncertain and
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1951], Art. 10

1951]

BOOK REVIEWS

predictions can be made only upon the basis of certainties. Hence in the old lady's
cases discupsed above, he could not advise her as to her rights. Yet the strong
probabilities in her. cases are that in the first place there never would be a dispute
about her note or about the title to her property, and in the next place, if there
were a dispute, a lawyer, upon the basis of known rules of law and the facts ascertained by him, could direct a correct disposition of the case without going to court.
Of course it is possible that a lying witness might appear to throw the case into
the realm of doubt, but it is highly improbable. Even if one did appear the probabilities are that the lie could be exposed. At any rate a lawyer. could weigh the
probabilities, venture a prediction and make a decision, and upon the basis of the
facts assumed above, he would be warranted in advising the old lady that her note
was valid and enforceable, and that she was the owner of the property in question.
Action of the Client in reliance upon the probabilities would be justifiable. It
seems to me that unless we accept probability of outcome as the basis of decision,!
not only in law but in all walks of life, we are completely stalemated--stymied, be-,
cause about the only certainties upon which we can rely are death and taxes. Legal'
action, like other action, must be based upon a calculated risk. Yes, certainty is an
illusion, but probability is a reality.
It is probable that if I walk to school I will not be run down and hit by a car.
I rely upon that probability and walk to school. In the great majority of cases the
reliance proves justifiable. One morning I may be hit. But that does not disprove
the probability. Most decisions in life as to a future course of action must be
made upon the basis of probabilities. A surgeon decides to operate, though there is
a chance that his patient will not survive the operation. With a deciding run on
second, a baseball manager directs his pitcher to pass a strong batter in order to get
at a weak one. Even though the weak hitter sometimes comes through with a hit
that wins the game, the strategy is still good, because most of the time it works.
Similarly decisions as to legal rights must be made. And as Holmes says the prediction itself is what makes the right or duty.
"Every day, if not every year," said Holmes, "we have to wager our salvation
upon some prophesy based upon imperfect knowledge." Frank quoted this sage
remark of the great Justice, but it came so near the end of his book (p. 246) that
he completely overlooked it in his discussion of predictability.
A great majority of legal transactions never get to court-possibly 99% of them
-and one of the reasons they never do, is that the parties, or their lawyers agree
that there is a high degree of probability as to how the case would be decided if
it went to court. Since there is agreement as to how the court would hold, if
suit were brought, no suit is brought. Litigation does not arise when predictions are
accurate, but only when they are inaccurate (i.e. conflicting). Frank trys to prove
that all decisions are unpredictable by selecting those cases in which predictions are
conflicting, and omitting all others. That is like saying that if you line up a group
of patients in a hospital and find that they are all sick, the conclusion is that all
people are sick.
Of course there are other reasons than accurate prediction, that keep legal
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss1/10
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transactions out of court Lack of financial resources to go to court, desire to avoid
worry and loss of time, and fear of the outcome are some of them. But many more
transactions never get to court, because no dispute arises, or if one arises, settled
law makes it possible for a lawyer to direct a disposition outside the courtroom.
According to Frank, the more predictable the law becomes the less there is of it,
because the fewer would be the cases taken to court. If decisions in all cases
(by means of some device yet uninvented) became predictable, then by Frank's
theory, law would completely disappear, yet it would then be most effective.
Now it may be admitted that in many cases, when facts are in dispute, and one
lawyer advises suit and another advises defense rather than settlement, the probabilities of outcome are about even, and the result cannot be predicted. But that is
true of only a very small percentage of the total of legal transactions. It may be
also admitted that in many cases the facts as found by the trial-court differ from
the "true" facts (but who knows the "true" facts), and that facts assumed by the
court of appeal differ from the "true" facts. Still the rule applied by the court of
appeal to the assumed facts will serve as a guide to a lawyer who has a case with
facts, which in his judgment are like those assumed by the court. Judge Frank
admits t at an appellate judge or a lawyer is an "excellent predicter of decisions"
upon an assumed state of facts. (p. 16) So the rules of law applied by appellate
courts upon assumed states of fact (or even upon completely hypothetical facts)
serve as guides to lawyers in directing the conduct of their clients, and advising
them as to the consequences of their action. This type of direction and advice
gradually trickles down to credit managers, salesmen, bank officers, real estate
agents, insurance agents and adjusters, labor leaders, notaries public and the common man, and determine their conduct and their direction and advice to others.
Judge Frank criticizes legal scholars (perhaps rightly) for an over emphasis
upon appellate-court law to the exclusion of trial-court law. But Frank commits,
what seems to me, a greater sin of overstressing trial-court law to the almost
complete exclusion of lawyer's law, notaries' public law, credit manager's law,
real estate agent's law, insurance agent's and adjuster's law, form-drafters' law,
bank teller's law, labor leader's law and the common man's law. He almost completely ignores the bulkiest part of the law,--that part which operates most effectively and peaceably as a guide to and regulator of people's conduct in millions
of transactions of daily occurrence-that part in which no disputes arise, or if
they arise are settled without going to court.
Trial-courts are important, just as hospitals are important, for taking care of
pathological cases, and by all means let us improve their procedures to make their
decisions more just. But let us not make the trial-court the center of the judicial
universe. After all, the principal function of a trial court is to settle a dispute
between two persons. Those two persons are usually the only ones directly
affected by the outcome. An appellate court, not only settles an issue between
two persons, it lays down rules which are intended to and which do affect all
members of society. And these rules are applied to thousands of cases by lawyers
in advising and directing their clients, and through lawyers are passed down to bank
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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officials, salesmen, businessmen, industrialists, labor unions and farmers throughout
the realm. The office of the lawyer is the clearing house for this gigantic enterprise. As I see it, this is the big tent. The court-trial is the side show.
Lack of space forbids extended discussion of the author's strictures on legal
education. A number of his criticisms are worthy of serious consideration. Legal
education has much to learn from men who have had the experience of Judge
Frank. But Frank's conception of the law as centering in the trial of cases, his
simulation of the law to the hand and foot skills, such as dancing, haircutting,
automobile driving, swimming, cooking, golfing and surgery (p. 229) and his conclusion that law should be similarly taught (i.e. by looking and doing) make some
of his views on legal education seem archaic and out-of-focus. No doubt a student
of anthropology should study hospital patients, but he would get a distorted view
of man if he made that the center. of his education. Just so it seems to me that
the student of law should study court trials (the pathological cases) but he
would get a warped view of the law if he made that the core of his study.
Yet Courts on Trial is a needed and valuable book. Limited to the scope
indicated by its title, it persuasively demonstrates that "the trial court's job of factfinding in each particular case.., looms up as one of the most important jobs in
modern court-house government" (p.102) and it shows that that job is not being
done satisfactorily. The book contains numerous brilliant passages that illuminate
dark and damp recesses of the law. It is full of learning. It is readable. It is
stimulating. I would especially commend to readers, as an antidote for much that
I have criticized in the book, the perusal of Judge Frank's penetrating and illuminating analysis of the correct judicial attitude in the making of decisions, taken
from one of his own opinions, and quoted on pages 412-415. The book is one to be
read and pondered by every student of the law whether he be pupil, teacher, lawyer
or judge.
GEORGE W. GOBLE*

SovIET CIvIL LAw-Private Rights and Their Background under the Soviet Regime.

By Vladimir Gsovski. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School. Two
volumes, 1948, 1949. Pp. xxxvii, 909; xx, 907, incl. index. $15.00.
Several years of work by a highly qualified scholar went into the preparation
of these volumes. The first volume is the treatise; the second is comprised of translations of the major Soviet codes and statutes affecting private rights.
The author is a former member of the Imperial Russian Bar and for some time
has been the chief of the Foreign Law Section of the Library of Congress.
As Professor Yntema remarks in the foreword, it is indeed remarkable that this
highly significant work should have waited more than thirty years after the 1917
Revolution to appear. A compensating factor today, however, is that as a result it
is up to date, or very nearly so, and its timeliness can scarcely be overstressed.
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss1/10
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There is much more here than a legal text and a translation of codes. For the
lawyer, the law teacher, the political scientist and the student, old or young, of
contemporary international problems for whatever purpose, this work has special
importance. Here one finds a remarkably full treatment of virtually the entire postRevolution Russian system of internal government and law. And of course this kind
of work is far. more enlightening, because presented dispassionately, far more frightening, because naked of adjectives, and gives far more insight, because apparently
unmotivated by a preconceived thesis, than any mere tirade against "the Red
menace," however eloquent.
A foreign lawyer wishing to gain a really penetrating insight into the American
way of life could perhaps gain it quickest by studying our main institutions of private law. For private law is in many ways more revealing than is anything else of
those characteristic things in our nation's life which are closest to the people and
felt to be enduring. So it is with the American lawyer wishing to gain a really penetrating insight into the Russian way of life-Mr. Gsovski's present work should be
first on his list
Here is the actual source material against which to test one's preconceptions,
and through which to arrive at an informed opinion, regarding a vital subject that
has heretofore been presented sketchily and second-hand at best. Here the hide of
propaganda is stripped from the Bear and a skillful autopsy is performed which
reveals much of what makes him tick, exposing the system in the image of which he
seeks to remake the world.
Many intellectually honest people have doubtless felt a certain insecurity in
constantly damning a system of law and' government, a system of administering
justice, about which they knew very little by way of specific fact. Now that knowledge is available, in a form especially valuable to the lawyer. Incredible though it
may seem, the major Soviet Civil Codes have never before been translated into
English. Mr. Gsovski has obviously rendered an invaluable service in making that
translation, and to it Volume Two is devoted.
Volume One, on the other hand, consists of a masterful survey of the background, development and general characteristics of the Soviet political and legal
systems, followed by detailed essays on particular major fields of Soviet law corresponding to our main fields of private law, such as contracts, torts, property, corporations and so on, plus several other topics which are necessary or helpful to a
rounded picture, such as "Discontinuity of Prerevolutionary Law and Vested
Rights," "Conditional Protection of Private Rights," and "Rights of Aliens and
Foreign Corporations." But there are also excellent treatments of Constitutional
Law, Labor Law, Family Law, Agrarian Legislation and Collective Farming, and
finally an account of Civil Procedure and Appeals.
Other reviewers have summarized certain of the Soviet legal theories which have
tell-tale political significance. I shall therefore only allude to the story of the nearly
complete reversal of the original attempt to abolish inheritance, the revival of the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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notion of fault in tort law, and the phenomenon that Soviet labor law is to a great
extent criminal in character.
If for nothing else, Mr. Gsovski's work would be worth reading for the light it
throws upon one's previous dark suspicion that private law in Russia is infinitely
more subservient to the demands of the state than American private law could ever
be-even if our concept of "public policy" should be invested with a sweep and
status far in excess of those it presently enjoys. Indeed, as Mr. Gsovski notes, in
the Soviet view all Soviet law is public.
The most valuable part of the work to the general reader is probably the initial
survey in Volume One. These first chapters cover, in some 270 pages, the stages of
development, often sharply twisting and reversing (like the Party Line?), of the
Soviet political and economic order since the Revolution, and the accompanying
Soviet conceptions of the place of law in society. These latter range from a virtual
contempt for law, as being purely an instrument of policy of the ruling clique, to
something approaching a respect for law, as an instrument of stability because it
"fortifies the stamina of the political regime and the span of governmental discipline." Even this newer attitude is a long way from Anglo-American ideas of the
rule of law, it will readily be seen. The Soviets appear to brush aside all the deeper
problems, however, with the assertion that, the Soviet Union being a classless society,
it is impossible that there can be any conflict between the interests of the citizens
and the interests of the government which represents them. Naturally, I would
suppose, any citizen who thinks he has a conflicting interest, in some particular fact
situation, must be wrong a priorti. Yet curiously enough against the background of
such an attitude toward public law, more private rights are protected in the Soviet
Union today than one would have thought, at least as between individuals. This is
of course not inconsistent, but it may whet the curiosity as to just what kind of
legal system Russia really has. Mr. Gsovski supplies the answers.
The potentialities of this compact work for the comparative method in teaching
a number of standard subjects in the law school curriculum should certainly not be
overlooked. The world situation being what it is, it could hardly fail to be exceptionally stimulating and useful to both professors and students to compare American
and Russian law as they go along in a course. Until this work was published, that
was practically impossible, but lack of familiarity with the Russian language can
no longer be an excuse. Better insight into both systems can just about be guaranteed.
The only fault this reviewer can find which may be worth mentioning here is
the lack of "cases." This is probably unavoidable for a variety of reasons, from
unavailability of materials to considerations of space. But the Anglo-American
lawyer misses "facts." The "law" is fully covered, and that is a great deal more than
we've had before.
ELvIs J. STAnR, JR.'
*Dean, College of Law, University of Kentucky.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss1/10
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D. STEUER, TRiAL LAWYER. By Aaron Steuer. New York: Random House,
1950. Pp. 301. $3.50.

Though the writer never personally knew Max Steuer, he admired him from
afar, having read much concerning him.
When he learned that Mr. Steuer's son had written an informal biography of
his father, he eagerly grasped the opportunity to read it. But as he finishes doing
so, he has a feeling that a fine opportunity has largely been lost.
Of course there is interest in the five summaries of Mr. Steuer's cross-examinations of what are termed "his most important cases." These summaries prove that
Mr. Steuer was a master of the art of cross-examination and from them one may
learn many lessons regarding that art. They prove further. that Mr. Steuer was a
careful and hard worker and that he gave of his best to the tasks before him.
However, this was already known, and his cross-examination in some of the cases
covered in this book had already been contained in other books of national distribution and were read long ago by the writer.
What had not previously been done adequately, and what Mr. Steuer's son
must be exceptionally well qualified to do, was to give an intimate story of the life
and character of Mr. Steuer. Perhaps, the writer's disappointment in this book is
caused by his love of real biography. He feels that one from such a book should
learn more fully than he learns from Aaron Steuer about the home life and the
struggles of the subject of the biography and should discover what facts caused
his life to take the course it did. There are stories not found in this book which tell
some of this. Would that the son had given us the full history.
CARL C. WHEATON*

*Professor of Law, University of Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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